Enslavement of the Church in Poland in 1953 by Marek, Łucja
The Person and the Challenges
Volume 9 (2019) Number 2, p. 53–68
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15633/pch.3450
Łucja Marek
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7355-5125
Historical Research Branch Office of the Institute for National Remembrance, Cracow, Poland
Enslavement of the Church in Poland in 1953
Abstract
The accord entered into by and between representatives of state and Church authorities 
on April 14th 1950 did not protect the Catholic Church from further repression. On Feb-
ruary 9th 1953, the State Council decreed with regard to the filling of ecclesiastical posts 
in the Church. Through such normative, the state authorities awarded themselves the 
right to interfere with the human resources aspect of religious creed. A categorical ob-
jection (Non possumus!) to  this policy determined the imprisonment of  the Primate 
Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński. The primate’s detention offered proper political conditions 
to engage in this and other campaigns targeting the authority, independence, and iden-
tity of the Catholic Church. The clergy’s influence on public life was restrained, and the 
Church was deprived of  independence. It might well be assumed that were it not for 
events of October 1956, the Church in Poland would have been permanently subjugated 
to the State.
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“I hereby commence a New Year of our Lord at the birthplace of Catholic Poland, 
St. Adalbert’s tomb. […] I delivered my sermon to a setting of today’s missal les-
son and a wondrously beautiful introit. I portrayed the fickleness of time in ref-
erence to the year departed, and the great unknown of the new and upcoming 
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one”. Cardinal Wyszyński, Primate of Poland, thus proceeded to describe the 
beginning of a new year on January 1st 1953 – a year which would prove to be 
one of the thorniest over the span of his entire service as primate.1
The accord entered into by and between representatives of state and church 
authorities on April 14th 1950 did not protect the Catholic Church from further 
repression, albeit it had provided for rights as well as  responsibilities of  the 
Church.2 While postponing some religious policy-related action, the accord 
was duly used to harass the clergy and place one demand after another upon 
ecclesiastical hierarchy, until the culmination of the year 1953 and claims the 
Church could no longer accept as a threat to sovereignty and independence, 
intended to subjugate the Church to state authority. In the first half of the 1950s, 
communists introduced Poland to solutions resulting in a temporary enslave-
ment of  the Church; yet these very same solutions proved ineffective in the 
long-term, ultimately resulting in a stronger position of the ideological „enemy”.
1. Contradicting the Accord
The accord signed in April 1950 did not prevent repression, in line with the intent 
and tactics of the authorities. On May 15th that year, Bolesław Bierut – acting 
chairman of the State Council, president of the Republic of Poland, and head 
of the hegemonic Polish United Workers’ Party at the time – notified Joseph 
Stalin of the accord entered into with the Catholic Church. In a letter directly 
addressing the Soviet leader, he explained, or, to be precise, offered justification 
that the pact had arisen from a tense situation, resulting from “the immense 
attack we had launched over the previous year, depriving the Catholic Church 
of multiple positions in the process”. He also pointed to a resonance favouring the 
authorities: the Church’s accord with the communists sowed doubt among the 
clergy, even in bishopric circles. Bierut went on to accentuate, “We will use this 
 1 S. Wyszyński, Pro memoria, vol. 2: 1953, ed. E. K. Czaczkowska, Warsaw 2017, published 
by the Institute for National Remembrance, p. 5.
 2 To view the content of the accord, see Podpisanie porozumienia między przedstawicielami 
Rządu RP i Episkopatu Polskiego (Accord Signed by and between Representatives of the Government 
of the Republic of Poland and the Polish Episcopate), “Dziennik Polski”, No. 104 (1874), April 
16th 1950, pp. 1–2. Document available in digital format at http://mbc.malopolska.pl/dlibra/
doccontent?id=8793&from=FBC (16.02.2019).
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gainful compromise to develop further confrontation, to the end of  restricting 
the Catholic Church’s influence across our country”.3
The largely adopted tactic provided i.a. for religious congregations being 
deprived of the right to operate schools they had been running, or to have any 
influence over the upbringing of children and youth. School buildings, boarding 
houses and dormitories, as well as hospitals and sanatoriums owned by religious 
orders were all seized. Nuns working as nurses were removed from nationalised 
institutions. Contrary to provisions of the accord, efforts were made to elimi-
nate religious education from schools.4 Minor seminaries were closed down 
in 1952. Catholic press and publications were destroyed. The clergy were forced 
into political involvement, participation in peace-promoting movement used 
as a ploy. Factions of so-called patriotic priests were formed, with a member-
ship of clergy loyal to the authorities and critical of actions taken by the Polish 
Episcopate and Holy See.5
In the aforementioned letter to Stalin of May 1950, Bierut emphasised that 
some bishops attempted to expand their activities, adding that “this, however, 
is countered by our resolute defiance”.6 Over subsequent years, the authorities 
organised a number of campaigns directly targeting the clergy. In January 1951, 
Bishop Czesław Kaczmarek, ordinary of Kielce, was arrested; five governors 
 3 A. Kochański, G. P. Muraszko, A. F. Noskowa, A. Paczkowski, K. Persak (selection and 
compilation), E. Rosowska (translation), Polska w dokumentach z archiwów rosyjskich 1949–1953 
(Poland in Documents from Russian Archives 1949–1953), Warsaw 2000 (“Dokumenty do dziejów 
PRL” [Documents Concerning the History of the Polish People’s Republic] series, brochure No. 
12), published by the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, pp. 79–80.
 4 By 1952, religious education had been withdrawn from all schools operated by the 
Children’s Friends Society, from 75% of schools located in Western and Northern Polish 
Territories (Upper Silesia included), and from 25% of the remaining Polish regions; over the 
course of one year, however, the proportions were greatly altered, if not evened out. J. Żaryn, 
Dzieje Kościoła katolickiego w Polsce (1944–1989) (The History of the Catholic Church in Poland 
(1944–1989)), Warsaw 2003, published by Neriton, Institute of History of the Polish Academy 
of Sciences, p. 117 et seq.
 5 Ibidem, pp. 130–132. A. Dudek, Państwo i Kościół w Polsce 1945–1970 (The State and 
Church in Poland 1945–1970), Cracow 1995, published by PiT, p. 27 et seq. In December 1951, 
a convention of the clergy and secular activists (chiefly from the PAX Association) was held 
in Wrocław to the purpose of criticising action taken by the Polish Episcopate and the Holy 
See with regard to ecclesiastical administration in so-called Western and Northern Territories. 
The Vatican proclaimed that permanent bishoprics would be formed once Polish state borders 
were recognised by West Germany.
 6 A. Kochański, G. P. Muraszko, A. F. Noskowa, A. Paczkowski, K. Persak (selection and 
compilation), E. Rosowska (translation), Polska w dokumentach z archiwów rosyjskich…, p. 80.
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of the apostolic administration were removed from the Western and Northern 
Territories (from Gdańsk, Olsztyn, Gorzów Wielkopolski, Opole and Wrocław), 
chapters were forced to elect vicars capitular as their successors.7 On April 1st 
1952, Fr. Antoni Słomkowski, the first post-war rector of the Catholic University 
of Lublin, was detained. Sentenced to three years of imprisonment for alleged 
foreign currency embezzlement, he had in all actuality been penalised for ob-
jecting to a forming a chapter of the Union of Polish Youth (youth organisa-
tion disseminating Marxist ideology) at the university. The helm of the Lublin 
University was taken over by Rev. Professor Józef Iwanicki, a catholic activist 
associated with the PAX Association, loyal to the establishment.8 Authorities 
applied a policy of introducing intra-community diversities to the Catholic 
University of Lublin.9
In May 1952, the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party 
considered and made a number of decisions to the end of further restraining 
Catholic Church activities and their impact on the population. Yet given the 
upcoming autumn elections to the Polish Sejm, “no sterner action was taken 
in this regard”, efforts shifted instead to weaken the influence of “reactionary 
priests” and foster “patriotic priests”.10 The machine was set in motion in the wake 
of October elections. In early November, Bishop Stanisław Adamski, ordinary 
of the Katowice diocese, was displaced along with suffragan bishops Juliusz 
 7 B. Fijałkowska, Partia wobec religii i Kościoła w PRL, (The Party vs. Religion and the 
Church in the Polish People’s Republic), vol. 1: 1944–1955, published by the University of Warmia 
and Mazury, p. 109 et seq.; A. Dudek, Państwo i Kościół…, pp. 25–26.
 8 In March 1956, after Bolesław Bierut’s death, Rev. Rector Iwanicki convoked a special 
session of the Senate of the Catholic University of Lublin, in the course of which he paid 
tribute to the communist leader; a message of condolences drafted during the session and 
dispatched to the government of the Polish People’s Republic referenced the death of a “great 
patriot”. M. Sobieraj, Między oporem a lojalnością. Działania SB wobec KUL na przykładzie 
rozpracowania prof. Jerzego Kłoczowskiego (Between Resistance and Loyalty. Security Service 
Actions Targeting the Catholic University of Lublin, Investigation and Invigilation of Professor Jerzy 
Kłoczowski as Case in Point), Lublin 2015, published by the Institute for National Remembrance, 
p. 67.
 9 J. Żaryn, Dzieje Kościoła…, pp. 120–121. Some of the “inconvenient” professor staff 
were forced to take early retirement, while approvals for independent academic positions 
were routinely denied. The new rector of the Catholic University of Lublin decided to yield 
to manifold compromise when faced with demands by the establishment – yet the institution 
remained “spiritually” independent.
 10 A. Kochański, G. P. Muraszko, A. F. Noskowa, A. Paczkowski, K. Persak (selection and 
compilation), E. Rosowska (translation), Polska w dokumentach z archiwów rosyjskich…, p. 150.
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Bieniek and Herbert Bednorz, as a direct result of a campaign petitioning the 
restoration of religious education classes to schools. In an atmosphere of ter-
ror, efforts were made to talk to priests to, at least, assure their loyalty, after the 
aforementioned bishops had been driven out.11 During the following month, 
Archbishop Eugeniusz Baziak and suffragan bishop Stanisław Rospond were 
detained, then banished from the neighbouring diocese of Cracow, on charges 
of allowing espionage and illegal foreign currency trading on curia territory.12 
These developments were linked to searches carried out throughout November, 
and arrests of curialists and persons suspected of working for an espionage 
network, later tried during the so-called Cracovian Curia Trial in January 1953.13 
The showcase trial was accompanied by a propaganda campaign also targeting 
Cardinal Stefan Sapieha, an ordinary deceased in July 1951. “The course of the 
trial itself is hugely convincing […], and enjoys immense public interest”, and 
“our Party has been enormously successful”, the head of the Cracovian secu-
rity service messaged in a cable to the head of the Ministry of Public Security 
in Warsaw after the third day in court.14
An approximate total of two hundred consecrated persons (priests, monks, 
and nuns) were in detention in the year 1953.15 Arrests of members of the clergy 
 11 A.  Dziurok, Kruchtoizacja. Polityka władz partyjno-państwowych wobec Kościoła 
katolickiego w latach 1945–1956 w województwie śląskim/katowickim, (Kruchtoizacja. Policies 
of Party and State Authorities Regarding the Catholic Church in the Years 1945–1956 in the Silesian/ 
Katowice Voivodship), Katowice 2012, published by the Institute for National Remembrance, 
p. 102.
 12 See R. Terlecki, Uwięzienie i powtórne wygnanie ks. arcybiskupa Eugeniusza Baziaka (The 
Imprisonment and Repeated Banishment of Fr. Archbishop Eugeniusz Baziak), in: R. Terlecki 
(ed.), „Do prześladowania nie daliśmy powodu…” Materiały z sesji poświęconej procesowi kurii 
krakowskiej (“We Gave no Grounds for Persecution…” Materials from the Session Regarding the 
Cracovian Curia Trial), Cracow 2003, published by the Institute for National Remembrance, 
pp. 159–173.
 13 See F. Musiał, M. Lasota, Kościół zraniony. Proces księdza Lelity i sprawa kurii krakowskiej 
(A Church Wounded. The Trial of Father Lelita and the Cracovian Curia Case), Cracow 2003, 
published by the Institute for National Remembrance.
 14 Cited after: J. Szarek, Propaganda komunistyczna w czasie tzw. procesu Kurii krakowskiej 
(Communist Propaganda during the so-called Cracovian Curia Trial), in: R. Terlecki (ed.), „Do 
prześladowania nie daliśmy powodu…, p. 180.
 15 B. Noszczak, Polityka państwa wobec Kościoła rzymskokatolickiego w Polsce w okresie 
internowania prymasa Stefana Wyszyńskiego 1953–1956 (Polish State Policy towards the Roman 
Catholic Church in Poland during the Period of the Detention of Primate Stefan Wyszyński 
1953–1956), Warsaw 2008, published by the Institute for National Remembrance, p. 345.
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on charges of espionage, financial fraud, attempted armed coups, and collabora-
tion with Nazi occupants, accompanied by publicly held trials and embellished 
with propaganda, were intended to impact the authority of the clergy and restrict 
their influence over the public, while strengthening the position of patriotic 
priests submissive to the establishment. This is how ground was prepared for 
the next stage: that of communist authorities assuming full control of in-house 
ecclesiastical policies, and depriving the Church of its independence.
2. State Proceedings to Fill Ecclesiastical Positions
On February 9th 1953, the State Council decreed with regard to  the filling 
of ecclesiastical posts in the Church. Through such normative, the state au-
thorities awarded themselves the right to interfere with the human resources 
aspect of religious creed. In view of the newly passed regulations, the taking 
of an ecclesiastical position in the Church – as well as dismissals, and transfers 
to other posts – required the former consent of relevant state bodies. Further-
more, official approval was also needed for the forming, transformation, and 
dissolution of said positions, as well as for any change to the scope of respon-
sibilities concerned. In case of diocesan ordinaries and suffragan bishops, the 
governmental Presidium was recognised as the correct authority of approval – 
with regard to all other posts, approval of presidiums of competent voivodship 
(provincial) state councils for the respective territory sufficed. Persons holding 
ecclesiastical positions in the Church were obliged to take “an oath of allegiance” 
to the Polish People’s Republic at the Authority for Religious Affairs, or to the 
presidium of a competent voivodship state council for the respective territory. 
The ordinance further provided for priests suspected “of activities violating the 
public law and order, or of supporting or shielding such activities” to be removed 
from office. The provision allowed authorities to eliminate irreverent members 
of the clergy on trivial and occasionally false charges.16
Only after three months had passed since the proclamation of the aforemen-
tioned normative did the president of the Council of Ministers issue a normative 
ordinance, executive by name, yet in all actuality – as aptly noted by Bishop 
 16 Journal of Law 1953 No. 10 item 32, Ordinance of February 9th 1953 concerning the 
filling of ecclesiastical posts in the Church.
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Tadeusz Pieronek – expanding the scope of the respective law.17 In the opening 
words of the ordinance, the prime minister justified its intent, namely that all 
persons of the cloth in ecclesiastical positions “discharge their duties in confor-
mity to the principles and requirements of the Constitution of the Polish People’s 
Republic” of July 22nd 1952. In reality, as indirectly confirmed by subsequent 
sentences herein, the purpose of the law was to promote so-called patriotic 
priests – clergy loyal to the establishment – and to marginalise priests who 
followed guidelines proclaimed by the Primate and Episcopate, defended the 
rights of the Church and persons of the catholic faith, and supported opposi-
tion circles.18 The ordinance laid out a sample questionnaire which had to be 
submitted on demand by respective authorities, jointly with a curriculum vitae, 
by members of the clergy in ecclesiastical positions. Disclosure requirements 
included i.a. military service records, decorations awarded, and membership 
in public and political organisations (by date: pre-1939, under Nazi occupation, 
and upon liberation), as a clear indication of political and ideological criteria 
of assessing the general views and attitudes of the clergy.19
A sample oath was further attached to the ordinance. The pledge contained 
within referenced loyalty to the state system and authority, efforts to develop 
“People’s” Poland, and, in all actuality, to foster the communist system across the 
society. The following declaration was demanded of diocesan and suffaragan 
bishops: “I hereby solemnly pledge allegiance to the Polish People’s Republic 
and Her Government. I do promise to take any action required to develop the 
Polish People’s Republic, and fortify Her power and security. I shall make any 
and every effort indispensable for my subordinate clergy – in conformity to their 
civic responsibility – to continue appealing to their respective congregations 
to show due respect for state law and authority, intensify work to expand the 
national economy, and improve the prosperity of the Nation. I do promise not 
to take any measure potentially contradicting interests of the Polish People’s 
 17 T. Pieronek, „Non possumus”. Linia obrony biskupów polskich przed skutkami dekretu 
„O obsadzaniu stanowisk kościelnych z 9 II 1953 (“Non Possumus”. The Line of Defence of Polish 
Bishops against the Outcomes of the Ordinance ‘On Filling Ecclesiastical Posts in the Church’), 
in: R. Terlecki (ed.), „Do prześladowania nie daliśmy powodu…, pp. 55–56.
 18 See Polish Monitor 1953, No. A-43, item 522, Ordinance No. 61 of the President of the 
Council of Ministers of May 5th 1953 regarding the enforcement of the ordinance concerning 
the filling of ecclesiastical posts in the Church, I. General Provisions, §1.
 19 See ibidem, Attachment No. 1 – Questionnaire for persons in ecclesiastical positions 
in the Church.
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Republic, or affecting the security or integrity of Her borders. Striving to secure 
the State’s interest and welfare, I shall make every effort to avert any endanger-
ment I am made aware of ”.20
The oath to be taken by other clergy in ecclesiastical posts, while slightly dif-
fering in mid-section, expressed the intent behind the bishops’ pledge, but with 
regard to congregations the clergy were in service to. Priests in ecclesiastical 
positions were obliged to declare that they would plea “for respect for state law 
and authority, intensified work to expand the national economy, and improved 
prosperity of the Nation”.21
The ordinance concerning the filling of ecclesiastical posts in the Church was 
to serve as a legal justification of communist efforts to control staffing policies 
of the Church, and impact system-related matters. A demand tabled by authori-
ties in 1952 was a distinct sign of the law having been usurped. In conversations 
with Cardinal Wyszyński, authorities required that a single candidate only 
be put forward for each of the vacancies in Cracow and Włocławek. As three 
candidates were to be nominated for each position under ecclesiastial rules, the 
primate questioned the claim, recognising it as an attempt to appoint staff and 
restrain papal jurisdiction.22
3. Non possumus of the Polish Episcopate
The ordinance of February 9th 1953 was unacceptable to the Polish Episcopate. 
Bishops could not accept atheist secular authorities – hostile towards the Church 
and religion at that – as arbitrary decision-makers in the staffing of parish 
or diocesan leadership. On February 16th, Episcopal Secretary Bishop Zygmunt 
Choromański filed a protest with Antoni Bida, the governmental minister re-
sponsible for affairs of religion and creed. The bishop accentuated that the 
normative contradicted the state-Church accord of the previous two years, the 
ordinance on freedom of conscience, and the constitution – statutory solu-
tions the authorities had so frequently referenced when admonishing the clergy 
for their actions.23 One day later, a similar position was taken by the primate 
 20 Ibidem, Attachment No. 2 – The Oath.
 21 Ibidem, Attachment No. 3 – The Oath.
 22 T. Pieronek, “Non possumus”…, p. 48.
 23 Ibidem, p. 49.
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in conversation with deputy speaker Franciszek Mazur. Cardinal Wyszyński 
took notes after the meeting: “Mr. Mazur explained that the ordinance carried 
no malicious intention […]. Following it would not be disruptive to the Church, 
as it were”. The primate did not trust these assurances, thus commenting on the 
deputy speaker’s words: “Mr. M[azur] presented his case with no enthusiasm 
or real conviction”.24
As reported by Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, the Episcopate engaged in legal 
debate with the government, attempting to limit the circle of positions potentially 
affected by the ordinance to the bare minimum by interpreting and defining the 
concepts and norms of canon law. The governmental party followed their own 
and different interpretation, rejecting all Episcopal postulates. Already during 
the first month after ordinance enactment, ordinaries were summoned and 
presented with lists of priests to be removed from office (effective immediately, 
or no later than within a term of three to five days), with no justification, charges, 
or appeal or defence options. In violation of the Constitution, the primate 
was also refused the right to appeal against the ordinance.25 The proclamation 
of executive provisions was delayed, all related Episcopal requests summarily 
ignored. One month after the enactment of the normative act, the ecclesiastical 
party declared that state authorities were interpreting the letter of law arbitrarily, 
or even applying practices not provided for in the document. A pledge of al-
legiance to the Polish People’s Republic was demanded from persons already 
holding ecclesiastical posts, whereas the statutory obligation had been only 
intended for priests newly taking position. Furthermore, the content of the 
pledge extended beyond the framework of the ordinance.26
Communist authorities usurped the right to interfere with ecclesiastical juris-
diction. Any attempt to take possession of the said space gave rise to the hazard 
of losing independence, or even identity. Bishops referred to the ordinance as “an 
assault on the organisational freedom of the Church”. They further accentuated 
that while according to the Gospel, the Catholic Church in Poland shall “render 
 24 S. Wyszyński, Pro memoria, vol. 2: 1953, ed. E. K. Czaczkowska, Warsaw 2017, published 
by the Institute for National Remembrance, p. 49.
 25 For more information, see: Bishop T. Pieronek, “Non possumus”…, pp. 51–53.
 26 Letter of the Episcopal Secretary to the Government with regard to the priests’ pledge 
of allegiance to the Polish People’s Republic, Warsaw, April 20th 1953, in: P. Raina, Kościół 
katolicki a państwo w świetle dokumentów 1945–1989 (The Catholic Church vs. the State in Light 
of Documents), vol.1: 1945–1959, Poznań 1994 (“Kościół w PRL” (The Church in the Polish 
People’s Republic) series), published by W drodze, pp. 405–406.
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unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s”, 
it cannot remain silent when the “Caesar” (that is, the authorities) reaches for 
things that are God’s, systematically appropriating rights undue to him.27 The 
Plenary Episcopal Conference of May 8th 1953 addressed the government with 
a memorandum describing the circumstances of the Church. Bishops pointed 
to acts of persecution experienced by ecclesiastical institutions and persons 
over the preceding three-year period, the accord in force notwithstanding, and – 
primarily – took position with regard to the ordinance passed in February. They 
categorically rejected all demands contained therein as unlawful and exceeding 
any acceptable boundaries of compromise. They further declared that should 
authorities obstruct the staffing process, bishops would rather not fill vacant 
positions than allow them to be assumed by unworthy individuals who “had let 
themselves be used as tools of diversion within the Church”. Bishops defended 
rights constituting the very essence of the Church. “We cannot render things 
that are God’s unto Caesar’s altars. Non possumus!”, read one of the final sen-
tences in the memorandum – a sentence which duly became a symbol for the 
protest, and for the resulting events. Primate Cardinal Wyszyński and Episcopal 
Secretary Bishop Choromański signed the memorandum on behalf and in the 
name of all bishops.28
Over the period of September 14th-21st 1953, Bishop Czesław Kaczmarek 
was tried before the District Military Tribunal of Warsaw, following indictment 
on charges of espionage for the Vatican and the US, of attempts at overthrow-
ing the system of the Polish People’s Republic by force, and of inciting warfare. 
The bishop was joined by other defendants: three priests from Kielce (Frs. Jan 
Danilewicz, Józef Dąbrowski, Władysław Widłak), and a nun (Servant Sister 
Syksta Waleria Niklewska). They were not the only persons indicted and sen-
tenced for alleged “anti-state and anti-national” collaboration with the ordinary 
of Kielce. The years 1952–1955 saw the so-called ricochet trials tying in with the 
case of Bishop Kaczmarek, resulting in the sentencing of ecclesiastical as well 
as of secular defendants.29 Towards late May 1953, Bierut as prime minister of the 
Polish government sought advice with the Soviet government – via Arkadyi 
 27 Non possumus. Memorandum of  the Polish Episcopate Addressing the Council 
of Ministers, Cracow, May 8th 1953, in: P. Raina, Kościół katolicki…, p. 418.
 28 Ibidem, pp. 426–427.
 29 For more related information and on the status quo of research, see T. Domański, 
D. Kozieł (compilation), Wokół procesu biskupa kieleckiego Czesława Kaczmarka. Wspomnienia 
nazaretanki s. Izabelli Machowskiej (On the Trial of the Bishop of Kielce Czesław Kaczmarek. 
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Sobolev, ambassador of the USSR to Warsaw – as to the “purpose and timeli-
ness” of holding a public trial for Bishop Kaczmarek. Bierut feared adverse 
international repercussions of a trial unprecedented in that never before had 
the defendant been a bishop. Arguing in favour of a public trial, he declared that 
it would indubitably “help expose actions of the reactory management of the 
Catholic clergy in the eyes of Polish believers”.30
In the course of proceedings involving the Bishop of Kielce, Fr. Karol Wojtyła, 
soon to become the ordinary of Cracow, reportedly said, “The machine is oper-
ating flawlessly and attacking consciously, using even the most objective of our 
utterances to its own purpose. […] Any unconsidered action eventually takes its 
toll on those who fail to remember the circumstances we live and operate under. 
The screw is slowly tightening, the battle progressively exacerbating”.31 Bishop 
Kaczmarek’s trial was the finale in a string of showcase proceedings targeting 
the Church, inaugurated in January 1951 with the so-called Wolbrom Trial, the 
list of defendants including i.a. the parish priest of Wolbrom Fr. Piotr Oborski, 
and his vicar Fr. Zbigniew Gadomski, both charged with collaboration with 
the covert Underground Army, and as Accomplices to manslaughter.32 Bishop 
Kaczmarek’s trial was broadly publicised, as had been the Cracovian Curia Trial. 
The Książka i Wiedza publishing house printed transcripts of both trials that 
same year, making them public.33 The primate believed that while the public 
Memoirs of Sister of the Holy Family of Nazareth Izabella Machowska), Kielce 2013, published 
by Jedność, Institute for National Remembrance, pp. 7–86.
 30 A. Kochański, G. P. Muraszko, A. F. Noskowa, A. Paczkowski, K. Persak (selection and 
compilation), E. Rosowska (translation), Polska w dokumentach z archiwów rosyjskich…, p. 165.
 31 J. Marecki, F. Musiał (ed.), J. Marecki, M. Lasota, R. Szczęch, Ku prawdzie i wolności. 
Komunistyczna bezpieka wobec kard. Karola Wojtyły (Towards Truth and Freedom. The 
Communist Security Service vs. Cardinal Karol Wojtyła), Cracow 2009, published by the Institute 
for National Remembrance, WAM, p. 56.
 32 See D. Pasich, Działalność Armii Podziemnej w Wolbromiu (Operations of the Underground 
Army in Wolbrom), in: Ł. Kamiński, G. Wołek (ed.), Zimowa Szkoła Historii Najnowszej 2012 
(Winter School of Contemporary History), Warsaw 2012 (the „Zimowa Szkoła Historii Najnowszej” 
series, vol. 1), published by the Institute for National Remembrance, pp. 36–47; R. Gryz, 
Oborski Piotr (1907–1952), in: J. Myszor (ed.), Leksykon duchowieństwa represjonowanego 
w PRL w latach 1945–1989 (Lexicon of Clergy Persecuted in the Polish People’s Republic in the 
Years 1945–1989), vol. 1, Warsaw 2002, published by Verbinum, pp. 205–206; idem, Gadomski 
Zbigniew (1921–1993), in: ibidem, pp. 58–59.
 33 See Proces księdza Lelity i innych agentów wywiadu amerykańskiego. Stenogram procesu 
odbytego przed Rejonowym Sądem Wojskowym w dniach 21 I – 26 I 1953 r. (Trial of Father Lelita 
and of other American Intelligence Agents. Transcript of the Trial before the District Military 
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generally approached charges faced by bishop Kaczmarek with mistrust,34 the 
case did not remain without impact on the public standing of other bishops. 
The primate had an inkling that “more would have to happen for the Episcopate 
of Poland to preserve moral authority”.35
4. A Church Weakened and Enslaved
Several days after the close of the Kielce ordinary’s trial, on September 25th 1953, 
in a staged climate of anti-ecclesiastical propaganda, the authorities apprehended 
and detained Cardinal Wyszyński. The uncompromising objection (Non possu-
mus!) to attempts to subject the Church to state authorities sealed the primate’s 
fate. The primate’s secretary Bishop Antoni Baraniak found himself in an iden-
tical predicament in the early hours of the following morning. Such were the 
final cases of detaining senior members of the clergy with attitudes perceived 
by authorities as hazardous to effects of taking political action against the Church. 
While communists were planning to hold a showcase trial against Cardinal 
Wyszyński – in semblance to proceedings against Bishop Kaczmarek – the idea 
was not followed through. The primate believed he owed such an outcome to the 
martyr’s stance assumed by Bishop Baraniak. Authorities also withdrew from 
proceedings against the primate’s secretary, for reasons of insufficient evidence.36 
Tribunal, January 21st – January 26th 1953), Warsaw 1953, published by Książka i Wiedza; 
Proces księdza biskupa Kaczmarka i innych członków ośrodka antypaństwowego i antyludowego. 
Stenogram procesu odbytego przed Wojskowym Sądem Rejonowym w Warszawie w dniach 14 IX – 
21 IX 1953 r. (Trial of Bishop Kaczmarek and other Members of Anti-State and Anti-National 
Circles. Transcript of the Trial before the District Military Tribunal in Warsaw, September 14th – 
September 21st 1953), Warsaw 1953, published by Książka i Wiedza.
 34 According to some accounts, chemical substances were administered to defendants, 
making them testify in line with judicial expectations, and confess to deeds they had not 
committed. People would switch their radios off during court broadcasts, and wear black as if 
in mourning. Ł. Kamiński, Społeczeństwo polskie wobec konfliktu Państwo – Kościół w latach 
1944–1956 (Reactions of the Polish Society to the State vs. Church Conflict of the Years 1944–1956), 
in: Kawecki, K. Kowalczyk, A. Kubaj (ed.), Społeczeństwo – Państwo – Kościół (1945–2000). 
Materiały z ogólnopolskiej konferencji naukowej, Szczecin 15–16 VI 2000 r., (Society – State – 
Church (1945–2000). National Scientific Conference Follow-up Materials, Szczecin, June 15th-16th 
2000), Szczecin 2000, published by Zachodniopomorskie, p. 16.
 35 S. Wyszyński, Pro memoria, vol. 3: 1953–1956, ed. I Czarcińska, fr. A. Gałka, Warsaw 
2018, published by the Institute for National Remembrance, pp. 26–27.
 36 B. Noszczak, Polityka państwa…, p. 68.
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The official decision may have also been affected by the overall mood across the 
public and among the clergy. The very fact of the most senior members of the 
clergy having been detained gave rise to terror and a sense of intimidation. The 
afore-quoted Fr. Wojtyła reportedly declared, “I am prepared for the worst, not 
least because multiple priests have openly been showing an inclination to adopt 
the State concept and co-operate with the Government. I do believe the struggle 
is slowly entering a new stage”.37 Furthermore, in the wake of Bishop Kacz-
marek’s trial and the primate’s detention, the establishment organised a major 
anti-ecclesiastical propaganda campaign in the autumn of 1953.38 Their mission 
was duly accomplished: the clergy’s influence on public life was restrained, any 
objections against the anti-Church religious policies duly suppressed.
At the time of the primate’s detention, ten out of the twenty-five dioceses 
and apostolic administrations were deprived of lawful governance, thirteen 
members of the Polish Episcopal Conference subject to a variety of limitations.39 
It goes without saying that the detention of Cardinal Wyszyński ultimately 
weakened the Church, allowing authorities to interfere with the process of staff-
ing ecclesiastical positions. Blackmailed with threats of further arrests, bishops 
yielded to official demands (appointing Bishop Michał Klepacz chairman of the 
Polish Episcopal Conference; publishing communication of appeasement and 
submissiveness to the establishment after the primate had been apprehended; 
and pledging “allegiance” to the Polish People’s Republic and the government). 
To quote Jan Żaryn, “The time of the most profound politicising of the Church 
had come”.40
The authorities were ruthless in enforcing the ordinance of February 9th 1953, 
often as not in violation of the letter of the referenced law. Irreverent priests were 
removed, ecclesiastical jurisdiction brutally interfered with. In 1954, a campaign 
of displacing priests, monks, and nuns was duly carried out. Not only were 
indigenous inhabitants and clergy suspected of revisionism deprived of their 
dwellings: sisters included in operation “X-2” were detained in centres in all 
 37 J. Marecki, F. Musiał (ed.), J. Marecki, M. Lasota, R. Szczęch, Ku prawdzie i wolności…, 
p. 58.
 38 For more on the subject, see B. Noszczak, Polityka państwa…, pp. 110–123.
 39 See J. Żaryn, Dzieje Kościoła…, pp. 146–147.
 40 Ibidem, p. 151 et seq.
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actuality serving as labour camps.41 Action to the purpose had been considered 
at least as early as 1952, as confirmed by a memo from the journal of Arkadyi 
Sobolev, ambassador of the USSR to Warsaw.42 The primate’s detention offered 
proper political conditions to engage in this and other campaigns targeting the 
authority, independence, and the identity of the Catholic Church. It might well 
be assumed that were it not for events of October 1956, the Church in Poland 
would have been permanently subjugated to the State.
***
While Catholic bishops agreed to concede to the establishment of communist 
Poland, such concessions did not endanger the identity of the Church itself. The 
ordinance of February 9th 1953 regarding the filling and dissolution of ecclesiasti-
cal posts resolved by the State Council was unacceptable; this is why the primate 
saw the final days of 1953 – the year he had opened in Gniezno, at the cradle 
of Polish Catholicism – in Stoczek near Lidzbark Warmiński, in solitude, far 
away from his home and congregation. In recapitulating his work and events 
of previous months, he wrote, “I have a profound sense of harm done to me 
by the government. I feel particularly injured by Mr. Mazur, who was aware of my 
guileless efforts to bring peace to the process of establishing proper arrangements 
between the Church and government. I bear no grievance against pres[ident] 
Bierut, albeit I do believe that he had failed to discharge his duty of defending 
a citizen deprived of his freedom in violation of the law. Nonetheless, I harbour 
no unfriendly feelings towards any of these people. I would have found myself 
incapable of causing them even the most minuscule of hurts. […] Sic volo! And 
with such feeling, I can now close the year, which is breathing its last this day”.43
While the 1953 events weakened the Church, they also proved disadvanta-
geous to the authorities and their policy in the long-term. The primate referred 
to his detainment as “violence” on behalf of the government, yet serving the 
purpose “of the Polish Episcopate preserving its moral authority” which had 
 41 See A. Mirek, Siostry zakonne w obozach pracy w PRL w latach 1954–1956 (Sisters 
of Religious Orders in Labour Camps in the Polish People’s Republic in the Years 1954–1956), 
Lublin 2009, published by the Catholic University of Lublin, pp. 190–250.
 42 See A. Kochański, G. P. Muraszko, A. F. Noskowa, A. Paczkowski, K. Persak (selection 
and compilation), E. Rosowska (translation), Polska w dokumentach z archiwów rosyjskich…, 
p. 151.
 43 S. Wyszyński, Pro memoria, vol. 3…, p. 46.
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been jeopardised i.a. in all the showcase court trials. He proceeded to explain, 
“From the vantage point of the «political raison d’etat», the government could 
not have committed a greater mistake than consenting to the rapid succession 
of two facts transpiring: Bishop Kaczmarek’s trial, and my imprisonment – the 
combination of the two is hugely meaningful”.44 The primate’s detainment and 
the martyrdom of the clergy yielded an outcome counterproductive to that 
which had been intended. Friedrich Engels’ notion of “persecution being the 
best way of activating unpopular beliefs” was duly confirmed in reality.45 Nearly 
one year after Cardinal Wyszyński’s release and the once-banished bishops’ re-
turn to their dioceses, party circles began criticising the effects of action taken 
against the Church. That and similar declarations were made: “It goes without 
saying that we suffered losses in our policies of religion and creed, having en-
countered a number of obstacles. The authority of the Catholic Church is on 
the rise, including that of her bishops, Cardinal Wyszyński leading them all”.46
Fr. Wojtyła proved to be a prophet in having uttered the following during 
times of 1953 repressions: “The screw is slowly tightening, the battle progres-
sively exacerbating; the outcome is known well in advance, ours the only victory 
imaginable”.47 The primate regained his freedom on October 28th 1956, in the 
wake of political changes across Poland. Ironically, he was the one dictating 
conditions of his return to Warsaw. The authorities agreed to a number of con-
cessions to the Church, i.a. by repealing the ordinance of February 9th 1953 and 
passing a new one on the organising and filling ecclesiastical positions – yet 
it  swiftly transpired that the move was purely opportunistic, a  short-lived 
period of warming up  to the Church, which duly passed with the so-called 
political thaw.48
 44 Ibidem, pp. 26–27.
 45 F. Engels, Literatura emigracyjna (Emigration Literature), in: Dzieła Marksa i Engelsa (The 
Writings of Marx and Engels), vol. 17, Warsaw 1968, published by Książka i Wiedza, pp. 589–590.
 46 State Archive in  Katowice, Voivodship Committee of  the Polish United Workers’ 
Party. Executive committee sessions, File No. 301/IV/298, minutes No. 19 of September 21st 
1957, Information on Activities of the Clergy on the Territory of the Katowice Voivodship and 
on Prevention Measures, undated, p. 9.
 47 J. Marecki, F. Musiał (ed.), J. Marecki, M. Lasota, R. Szczęch, Ku prawdzie i wolności…, 
p. 56.
 48 See Ł. Marek, Priorytety polityki wyznaniowej władz w okresie Gomułki (Official Religious 
Policy Priorities in Gomułka’s Times), “Glaukopis” 33 (2016), pp. 254–284.
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